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A Reputation-Based Announcement
Scheme for VANETs
Qin Li, Amizah Malip, Keith M. Martin, Siaw-Lynn Ng, and Jie Zhang
Abstract—Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) allow vehicles
to generate and broadcast messages to inform nearby vehicles
about road conditions, such as traffic congestion and accidents.
Neighboring vehicles can utilize this information, which may
improve road safety and traffic efficiency. However, messages
generated by vehicles may not be reliable. We propose a novel
announcement scheme for VANETs based on a reputation system
that allows evaluation of message reliability. We present a secure
and efficient scheme that is robust and fault tolerant against
temporary unavailability of the central server.
Index Terms—Announcement scheme, message reliability,
reputation system, vehicular ad hoc networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A VEHICULAR ad hoc network (VANET) is formedby roadside infrastructure and mobile nodes embedded
within vehicles that are connected in a self-organized way. Ac-
tive research in VANETs is demonstrated by numerous papers
in the academic literature, for example, [1]–[19] and ongoing
projects [20], [21] in the industry. VANETs allow vehicles to
generate and broadcast messages about road conditions, such
as traffic congestion, accidents, and road conditions. We call
these kinds of messages road-related messages and a scheme
that facilitates vehicles to generate and broadcast road-related
messages an announcement scheme. Broadcast of road-related
messages may help vehicles to be aware of the situation ahead
of them and, as a result, may provide a safer driving environ-
ment. In addition, it also has the capability to improve efficiency
of traffic on road networks. However, these benefits can only be
realized if the road-related messages generated by vehicles are
reliable.
We say that a message is reliable if it reflects reality.
Unreliable messages may result in various consequences, for
example, journey delays or accidents. Unreliable messages may
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be the result of vehicle hardware malfunction. For example,
if a sensor in a vehicle is faulty, then the messages generated
based on the information provided by the faulty sensor may be
false. Unreliable messages can also be generated intentionally.
For example, some vehicles may generate and broadcast false
road congestion messages with the intention to deceive other
vehicles into avoiding certain routes. In the extreme case,
unreliable message may lead to injuries and even deaths. Hence,
evaluation of the reliability of vehicle-generated messages is of
importance in VANETs.
In a large VANET environment, vehicles are assumed to
have a weak (or no) trust relationship with each other [2]. This
raises the question: how do vehicles decide whether to rely on
a message? In this paper, we address this problem by proposing
a novel reputation-based announcement scheme for VANETs.
The reliability of a message is evaluated according to the
reputation of the vehicle that generates this message. A message
is considered reliable if the vehicle that generates the message
has a sufficiently high reputation. The reputation of a vehicle
is represented by a numerical score. This reflects the extent to
which the vehicle has announced reliable messages in the past.
It is computed based on feedback reported by other vehicles.
Feedback contains a numerical score representing the feedback-
reporting vehicle’s evaluation of the reliability of the message.
The score is collected, updated, and certified by a trusted party
(e.g., a reputation server). The reputation score evolves, as time
elapses, based on the reliability of messages that the vehicle
announces. Vehicles tend to give positive feedback for reliable
messages. This increases the reputation score. Meanwhile, a
reputation score decreases when negative feedback is reported.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss
related work in Section II. In Section III, we introduce the
entities involved in our scheme and their relationships. We also
introduce the notation and algorithms needed in our scheme
and show how to initialize a system that applies our scheme.
We then elaborate our scheme in Section IV. We analyze the
robustness of the scheme in Section V. In Section VI, we
discuss other properties of our scheme and some related issues.
In Section VII, we analyze the performance of our announce-
ment scheme. Section VIII shows some possible approaches to
extending the scheme. We conclude in Section IX and discuss
future work.
II. RELATED WORK
There have been a number of announcement schemes pro-
posed to evaluate the reliability of announcement messages in
VANETs. Generally, a message is considered reliable if 1) the
0018-9545/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE
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integrity of the message is valid, 2) the message was generated
and announced by a legitimate vehicle, and 3) there is a means
of “measuring” message reliability.
Digital signatures are commonly used to satisfy the first two
requirements [1]–[3], [5], [6], [9], [10], [12], [14], [18], [19].
To achieve the third requirement, different techniques have
been proposed. These include the threshold method [2], [3],
[10], [14], [19], network modeling [6], and trust-based and
reputation-based models [1], [5], [12], [18]. We will discuss
those most closely related to our work.
A majority of the schemes in the literature uses the threshold
method, for example, [2], [3], [10], [14], [19], and [22]. In this
mechanism, a vehicle accepts a message if it receives messages
with the same content that have been announced by a number of
distinct vehicles that exceed a threshold within a time interval.
The threshold may be a fixed system-wide parameter [3], [14]
or a flexible parameter [2], [10], [19]. The threshold has to
be chosen carefully. It should not be so high that insufficient
endorsement occurs and vehicles are not able to utilize the
information received. It should not be so low that the decision
may be affected by the presence of adversaries. In our scheme,
we do not require multiple messages from other vehicles to
evaluate the reliability of a message. Indeed, we may only
need to verify one message provided that the reputation of the
announcing vehicle is sufficiently high. This allows vehicles to
make decisions and act upon messages quickly.
Golle et al. [6] proposed the evaluation of message reliability
by modeling the network. They present a scheme that allows
vehicles to detect and correct malicious messages in VANETs.
Vehicles are assumed to maintain a “model” of the VANET,
which contains all the knowledge that the vehicles possess
about the VANET. A vehicle can then compare the messages
received against the model of the VANET. A message that is
consistent and agrees with the vehicle’s model is likely to be
accepted as valid. Inconsistent messages are addressed using
a heuristic approach. A vehicle will search for explanations
for the inconsistent messages and rank all possible explana-
tions according to the heuristic approach. The message with
the highest scoring explanation will be validated. However,
requiring vehicles to possess a wide knowledge of the network
may be infeasible and impractical. In our work, we propose a
simpler and more practical model. We evaluate messages based
on the simple principle of reputation, where the reliability of
a message generated by a vehicle is reflected by its reputation
score.
Several trust- and reputation-based models, for example, [1],
[5], [12], and [18], have been presented in the literature. In these
schemes, a decentralized infrastructure is adopted. However,
the issue associated with decentralized infrastructures is that
robustness is often not guaranteed.
In [5], Dötzer et al. proposed a reputation system based on
a mechanism called opinion piggybacking. In this approach, a
vehicle generates a message and broadcasts it to neighboring
vehicles. A receiving vehicle will append its own opinion about
the reliability of the message, which may be based on the
content of the message or the aggregated opinions already ap-
pended to the message. Upon receiving a message, a vehicle is
required to compute and aggregate previous opinions appended
to the message before it decides and generates its own opinion.
This may create a computational burden on receiving vehicles.
In addition, details of implementation such as the initialization
of the reputation system and the updating of reputation scores
of vehicles were not discussed. Issues of revocation and ro-
bustness against possible collusion of adversaries were also not
addressed.
In the scheme of Minhas et al. [12], message reliability is
evaluated by a hybrid approach to model the trustworthiness of
the message generator. In this scheme, vehicle trustworthiness
is modeled based on the combination of three trust models:
1) role-based trust; 2) experience-based trust; and 3) majority-
based trust. Role-based trust exploits certain predefined roles
that are enabled through the identification of vehicles. For
example, vehicles may have more trust toward traffic patrol
or law enforcement authorities compared with other vehicles.
To avoid impersonation attacks, each vehicle is required to
possess a certificate that includes its name, role, and public
key, issued by a trusted authority for authentication purposes.
Majority-based trust is similar to the threshold method that we
discussed earlier. Experience-based trust is established based
on direct interactions: A vehicle determines who to trust based
on how truthful they have been in their past interactions.
However, such a model requires vehicles to establish a long-
term relationship with each other, which may not be practical
in a large VANET environment. Furthermore, it also requires
vehicles to store information regarding vehicles that they have
encountered in the past. This may lead to storage problems. A
similar approach of experienced-based trust was proposed by
Patwardhan et al. [1].
Schmidt et al. proposed a framework for vehicle behavior
analysis in [18]. A vehicle’s behavior refers to all observable
information, including its movement and position in the past
and present. A receiving vehicle accumulates a sequence of
messages from a broadcasting vehicle, and these may provide
sufficient information for behavior analysis. The result of this
analysis will help to determine a vehicle as trustworthy, neutral,
or untrustworthy. In this approach, vehicles are required to
make observations before a decision can be made. This may
not be desirable in VANETs, since vehicles are not able to act
quickly upon the messages received.
Compared with these trust- and reputation-based approaches,
our work features the follows.
1) We take advantage of the already-existing centralized
infrastructure in a highly dynamic and distributed envi-
ronment of VANETs. This allows us to design a secure
and efficient announcement scheme.
2) We design a comprehensive announcement scheme using
a reputation system that allows evaluation of message
reliability that is practical, efficient, and robust against
adversaries. Vehicles may provide feedback for mes-
sages received. These feedbacks accumulate to a vehicle’s
reputation score. Hence, short-term encounters between
vehicles may lead to long-term trust, which is represented
by reputation scores.
3) Vehicles can quickly decide whether to rely on a message
or not based on the reputation score. The reputation score
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reflects the extent to which a vehicle has announced
reliable messages in the past, which reflects the likelihood
that it will announce reliable messages in the future.
Here, we focus only on the research related to the issue of
evaluating message reliability for an announcement scheme in
VANETs. For other issues, see [2], [10], [23], and [24] for wider
overviews of the topic.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the entities involved in our
scheme and their relationships. We also introduce some algo-
rithms and notation. Finally, we will describe how to initialize
the system.
A. Entities
Our system consists of three types of entity: 1) a reputation
server; 2) access points; and 3) vehicles.
1) Reputation Server: We rely on a centralized reputation
server that we assume is a trusted authority. One role of the
reputation server is to maintain the reputation of vehicles. This
includes collecting feedback, aggregating feedback to produce
reputation, and propagating reputation. The reputation server
is also in charge of admitting vehicles into and revoking them
from the system.
There are several justifications for adopting a centralized
architecture. First, it is a common practice that vehicles are
regulated and governed by some centralized authority, such
as the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency in the United
Kingdom. Hence, it is natural to adopt a centralized architec-
ture. In addition, a centralized architecture has some advantages
over a decentralized system. For example, it is often easier to
manage, control, and secure a centralized system.
We assume that the reputation server is equipped with a
clock.
2) Access Points: Our scheme relies on access points, which
are physical wireless communication devices. These are con-
nected with the reputation server, acting as a communication
interface between vehicles and the reputation server. The pur-
pose of access points is to allow vehicles to communicate with
the centralized reputation server in a convenient and frequent
manner. It is worth noting that our scheme does not require a
vehicle to be able to communicate with the reputation server all
the time. Further, our scheme does not require a secure com-
munication channel between an access point and the reputation
server in the normal running of the scheme. Rather, it suffices
that a public communication channel connects an access point
and the reputation server.
We envisage that access points are installed at locations
frequently visited by vehicles such as fuel stations, service
stations, and traffic lights. The number of access points required
depends on the size of the system, the road topology and traffic
patterns, etc.
3) Vehicles: Vehicles are the end users of the system. They
broadcast and receive messages to and from their neighboring
vehicles. In our scheme, a vehicle comprises the actual vehicle
and its human user. We assume that there is no prior trust
between vehicles. Upon receipt of a message, the receiving
vehicle needs to evaluate the reliability of the message before
considering how to act upon it.
We assume that a vehicle is equipped with a computing
device called an onboard unit (OBU), which has wireless
communication capability to broadcast and receive messages to
and from other OBUs on neighboring vehicles. In addition, we
assume that trusted hardware is embedded as part of an OBU
so that no secret data can be learned by anyone, including the
vehicle itself. The trusted hardware can securely store keys and
perform embedded cryptographic operations, such as digital
signatures. We also assume that a secure clock is embedded
within the trusted hardware.
B. Algorithm Components and Notation
The algorithms needed in our scheme are described as
follows.
1) Our scheme requires a reputation aggregation algorithm
Aggr. It computes a reputation score for each vehicle
based on feedback reported by other vehicles. We will
discuss it in more detail in Section IV-F.
2) We need a time discount function, denoted by
TimeDiscount. It is a nonincreasing function whose
range is [0, 1]. It takes as input a nonnegative value
representing a time difference and outputs a number
between 0 and 1. One simple example is
TimeDiscount(t) =
{
1 − t/Ψtd, if t < Ψtd
0, if t ≥ Ψtd
where Ψtd > 0 is a public parameter, determining
how quickly the time discount function decreases as t
increases.
3) We require two secure digital signature schemes, de-
noted by DS1 = (KeyGen1, Sign1,Verify1) and DS2 =
(KeyGen2, Sign2,Verify2), where KeyGen, Sign, and
Verify denote key generation, signing, and verification
algorithms, respectively. We use two digital signature
schemes because they will be used for different purposes,
and hence, there may be different requirements for each
scheme.
4) We require a secure cryptographic hash function denoted
by H.
5) We require a secure message authentication code (MAC)
algorithm denoted by MAC.
6) We also require a vehicle clock regulation protocol de-
noted by VCRP. It consists of a server-side protocol,
denoted by VCRPS, and a vehicle-side protocol, denoted
by VCRPV. The purpose of VCRP is to ensure that only
the reputation server is able to regulate the secure clock
embedded in the trusted hardware of a vehicle. An entity
authentication protocol can be applied to achieve the
protocol VCRP.
7) We require three configurable public parameters Ψrs, Ψt,
and T. The parameter Ψrs acts as a threshold and is
used by a vehicle to determine whether another vehicle is
reputable. It is a constant between 0 and 1. The parameter
Ψt also acts as a threshold and is used to determine
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whether a message tuple is sufficiently fresh for feedback
reporting. The parameter T is a large time interval over
which a sufficiently large number of vehicles report feed-
back relating to a vehicle.
C. Initialization of the System
The initialization of the system includes initialization of the
reputation server, new vehicles, and new access points.
1) Initialization of the Reputation Server: When a new an-
nouncement scheme is set up, the reputation server is initialized
as follows.
1) It installs the reputation aggregation algorithm Aggr.
2) It installs the algorithms KeyGen1, Sign1, KeyGen2, and
Verify2.
3) It generates its own public and private key pair (pkS , skS)
using KeyGen1. The private key skS is then kept
confidential.
4) It installs the server-side protocol VCRPS.
5) It regulates its own clock.
6) It creates a database that will store the following data for
every vehicle in the system: the identity, public key, MAC
key, current reputation score, and all feedback reported
for the vehicle.
2) Admission of New Vehicles: When a new vehicle V
chooses to join the system, it is initialized as follows.
1) It assigns it a unique identifier, denoted by idV .
2) It generates a public and private key pair, which are de-
noted by (pkV , skV ), for the vehicle using the algorithm
KeyGen2.
3) It generates a MAC key mkV for the vehicle.
4) It embeds the private key skV , the MAC key mkV , and
the algorithm Sign2 into the trusted hardware of the vehi-
cle. It also embeds the vehicle clock regulation algorithm
VCRPV into the trusted hardware. We require that the
confidentiality of skV and mkV is protected during the
embedding.
5) It applies the server-side protocol VCRPS to send a clock
regulation instruction to regulate the clock embedded
within the trusted hardware of V .
6) It installs the hash function H, the algorithms Verify1 and
Verify2, its own public key pkS , and the thresholds Ψrs
and Ψt into the OBU of the vehicle. Note that these are
not necessarily installed into the trusted hardware of the
vehicle.
7) It creates a record in its database for vehicle V containing
idV , pkV , and mkV . The initial reputation score field is
set to 0, and the feedback field is left empty.
3) Installation of New Access Points: When a new access
point is installed in the system, a communication channel needs
to be established between the access point and the reputation
server. Subsequently, the access point serves as a communica-
tion interface between vehicles and the reputation server.
IV. OPERATION OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT SCHEME
We describe our scheme by showing how the reputation
of a vehicle is formed, propagated, updated, and utilized to
determine the reliability of a message sent by the vehicle. The
operation of the scheme consists of the following phases: rep-
utation certificate retrieval, message announcement, message
reliability evaluation, feedback reporting, reputation update,
and vehicle revocation.
A. Reputation Certificate Retrieval
In this phase, a vehicle retrieves its latest reputation cer-
tificate from the reputation server. When a vehicle Vb drives
into the wireless communication range of an access point, it
retrieves its own reputation certificate from the central server
via the access point as follows:
1) Vb sends its identity idVb to the server via the access point.
2) The reputation server generates a reputation certificate C
for the vehicle, where
C = (idVb , pkVb , tc, rsVb , σ)
in which tc denotes the time when C is generated,
and it is obtained from the reputation server’s clock,
rsVb denotes the reputation score of Vb at time tc, and
σ = Sign1(idVb , pkVb , tc, rsVb)skS denotes a digital sig-
nature using the algorithm Sign1 and private key skS on
(idVb , pkVb , tc, rsVb).
3) The reputation server sends C to Vb via the access point.
4) Once Vb obtains C, it stores the reputation certificate
locally. Previously obtained reputation certificates can
then be deleted.
Note that in this procedure, Vb is not required to authenticate
itself to the reputation server. This is because the reputation
certificate is not confidential and can be retrieved by any
vehicle. We will show later that there is no point in one vehicle
retrieving the reputation certificate of another vehicle.
In addition, Vb does not need to retrieve a new reputation
certificate every time it meets an access point. It only needs
to do so when its time-discounted reputation value rsVb ·
TimeDiscount(t− tc), where t denotes the current time, will
be less than the reputation threshold Ψrs before it meets another
access point in the future.
B. Message Broadcast
In this phase, Vb generates a road-related message and broad-
casts it to its neighboring vehicles. This is described as follows.
1) Vb converts the information obtained, for example, from
its sensors or driver, into a message m. The technical
detail of how this is done is beyond the scope of this
paper. It computes the hash value H(m), which it then
submits to its trusted hardware.
2) The trusted hardware retrieves the current time tb from its
embedded clock and generates a time-stamped signature
θ, where
θ = Sign2 (tb,H(m))skVb
and Vb outputs tb and θ.
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3) Vb forms a message tuple M , where
M = (m, tb, θ, C)
and Vb broadcasts M to its neighboring vehicles.
C. Message Reliability Evaluation
Upon receiving the message tuple M = (m, tb, θ, C), a re-
ceiving vehicle Vr performs the following procedure:
1) Vr submits θ to its trusted hardware.
2) The trusted hardware retrieves the current time tr from its
embedded clock, stores the tuple (tr, θ), and then outputs
tr to Vr.
3) Vr checks the following:
a) whether the time-discounted reputation score is ac-
ceptable, i.e.,
rsVb · TimeDiscount(tr − tc) ≥ Ψrs
where tc is extracted from C;
b) whether the message tuple M is sufficiently fresh, i.e.,
tr − tb ≤ Ψt;
c) whether σ ∈ C is valid, by using the verification al-
gorithm Verify1 and the public key of the reputation
server pkS ;
d) whether θ is valid, by using the verification algorithm
Verify2 and the public key pkVb , which can be ex-
tracted from C.
If all checks are positive, then vehicle Vb is considered
to be reputable. Message m is thus considered as reliable
and can be taken into consideration. The message tuple
M is stored for future feedback reporting. Otherwise, Vb
is not considered to be reputable, and m is not considered
to be reliable. However, if at least Steps 3b, 3c, and 3d
are positive, then the message tuple M is still stored for
future feedback reporting; otherwise, it is discarded.
D. Feedback Reporting
In this phase, when vehicle Vr has its own experience about
the event that the message m describes, it is able to judge the
reliability of the message. Then, if Vr wants to report feedback
to the reputation server, it performs the following procedure.
1) Vr generates a feedback rating fr ∈ {0, 1}, where fr =
1 represents that m is reliable, while fr = 0 represents
that m is false. In this paper, we only use binary feedback
rating for simplicity.
2) Vr submits (idVb , idVr , fr, tb,H(m), θ) to its trusted
hardware.
3) The trusted hardware retrieves tr from the tuple (tr, θ)
that was previously stored during the message reliability
evaluation phase and computes a MAC value δ, where
δ = MAC (idVb , idVr , fr, tb, tr,H(m), θ)mkVr
and the trusted hardware then outputs tr and δ.
4) Vr forms a feedback tuple F , where
F = (idVb , idVr , fr, tb, tr,H(m), θ, δ) .
We say that F is positive feedback if fr = 1 and negative
feedback if fr = 0.
5) When Vr drives into wireless communication range of
an access point, it sends the feedback tuple F to the
reputation server via the access point.
Note that Vr is not required to authenticate itself to the
reputation server during feedback upload. This is because F
contains the MAC value θ, which can only be generated by Vr
and the reputation server.
E. Reputation Update
In this phase, the reputation server updates the reputation
score rsVb of vehicle Vb on receipt of a feedback tuple F =
(idVb , idVr , fr, tb, tr,H(m), θ, δ) as follows:
1) The reputation server first checks the following:
a) whether tr − tb ≤ Ψt;
b) whether δ is valid, by computing a MAC on the
tuple (idVb , idVr , fr, tb, tr,H(m), θ) using mkVr and
checking whether it matches δ;
c) whether θ is valid, by using the algorithm Verify2
and pkVb .
If any check fails, then this procedure is terminated,
and F is discarded.
1) If the checks pass, then the reputation server considers
the feedback tuple F as valid and stores it in the
database.
2) The reputation server applies the reputation aggrega-
tion algorithm Aggr on all stored feedback relating
to Vb to compute the latest reputation score rsVb for
vehicle Vb. It then replaces the previous reputation
score in the database with rsVb .
F. Reputation Aggregation Algorithm
In this section, we discuss how the reputation aggregation
algorithm Aggr works. We will show how Aggr produces the
latest reputation score rsV for vehicle V based on all stored
feedback as follows.
1) The aggregation algorithm Aggr first selects all feedback
reported for V whose corresponding message tuple was
broadcast from time T in the past up to the present
time. More formally, let ta denote the time when this
aggregation is running. The algorithm Aggr selects a
subset of feedback F , where
F = {F : (idVb = idV ) ∧ (tb ≥ ta − T)} .
The feedback whose corresponding message was broad-
cast earlier than time T in the past is ignored and deleted
if necessary for the sake of data storage efficiency.
2) Multiple feedback reported by one vehicle Vi for V
is aggregated into one intermediate value rˆVi . Let FVi
denote the set of feedback reported by the vehicle Vi for
V and whose corresponding message was broadcast from
time T in the past up until the present time, i.e.,
FVi = {F : (idVb = idV ) ∧ (idVr = idVi) ∧ (tb ≥ ta − T)} .
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fr · (T− (ta − tb))
∑
F∈FVi
(T− (ta − tb)) . (1)
This gives the more recent feedback greater weight than
the less recent feedback.Let V denote the set of vehicles
that have each reported at least one feedback for V in the
past T time, i.e.,
V = {Vi : (idVb = idV ) ∧ (idVr = idVi) for some F ∈ F} .
The value rˆVi is computed for each vehicle Vi ∈ V .
3) Let V− denote the set of vehicles reporting at least one
negative feedback for V in the past T time, i.e.,
V− = {Vi : (idVb = idV ) ∧ (idVr = idVi)
∧(fr = 0) for some F ∈ F} .







|V| , if |V−| < Ψnf
0, otherwise
(2)
where Ψnf is a configurable public parameter. Its impact
on the robustness of the scheme and its configuration will
be discussed in Section V-B. The intuition of this equation
is that rsV is computed as the average of rˆVi if not too
many vehicles reporting negative feedback for V in the
past T time; otherwise, rsV decreases to 0, indicating that
V has conducted a message fraud attack, which will be
discussed in Section V-B.
G. Vehicle Revocation
The reputation server revokes a vehicle from the system if
|V−| < Ψnf . If a vehicle is revoked, then the reputation server
stops providing new reputation certificates for it. Feedback
reported by the revoked vehicle will not be considered as valid.
Note that previously issued reputation certificates will gradually
expire as time elapses.
V. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the robustness of our scheme
in the presence of adversaries with respect to the following
attacks.
1) Message fraud. In this attack, an adversary deceives a
vehicle complying with the scheme into believing that a
false message m′ is reliable.
2) Reputation manipulation. In this attack, an adversary
unfairly inflates or deflates the reputation score of a target
vehicle. This target vehicle can be the adversary itself.
Note that reputation manipulation may lead to message
fraud, since an adversarial vehicle can get its reputation
unfairly inflated by a reputation manipulation attack and
then launch a message fraud attack.
We categorize adversaries into two groups.
1) External adversaries attack the system without joining as
legitimate vehicles.
2) Internal adversaries are legitimate vehicles that attack the
system.
We define a notion of robustness: an announcement scheme
provides (ΦMF ,ΦRM ) robustness if we have the following.
1) ΦMF is the maximum number of vehicles that an adver-
sary can deceive during a time period of length T without
itself getting revoked. This evaluates the extent to which
the scheme is robust against a message fraud attack.
2) ΦRM is the maximum value by which the reputation
score of a vehicle can be unfairly manipulated (increased
or decreased) by adversaries. This evaluates the extent to
which the scheme is robust against a reputation manipu-
lation attack.
We say that an announcement scheme provides strong ro-
bustness if it provides (0, 0) robustness, i.e., ΦMF = 0 and
ΦRM = 0.
A. Robustness Against External Adversaries
1) Robustness Against Message Fraud:
Claim 1: Our proposed scheme provides strong robustness
against external adversaries conducting message fraud.
Proof: To perpetrate a message fraud attack, an external
adversary can engage in any of the following strategies.
1) Obtain a valid reputation certificate C for a vehicle V and
then forge a message tuple M ′ = (m′, tb, θ, C) contain-
ing a false message m′ in the name of V .
2) Forge a reputation certificate C ′, and then, create a valid
message tuple M ′ = (m′, t, θ, C ′) containing a false mes-
sage m′.
3) Corrupt a vehicle V that is about to generate and broad-
cast a message tuple M = (m, tb, θ, C), and then, replace
m with a false message m′ so that V will generate and
broadcast M ′ = (m′, tb, θ, C).
An external adversary is not able to forge a valid reputation
certificate C or a valid message tuple M , unless the adversary
has access to either the private key skS or skV . Hence, assum-
ing that the digital signature schemes used are secure and the
reputation server and vehicles manage keys appropriately, then
the adversary is not able to succeed using the first two strategies.
It is also reasonable to assume that an external adversary is not
able to corrupt a vehicle to replace the message m generated by
the vehicle with a false message m′ before the message tuple
M is generated. Hence, we can regard our scheme as providing
strong robustness against message fraud attacks. 
2) Robustness Against Reputation Manipulation:
Claim 2: Our proposed scheme provides strong ro-
bustness against external adversaries conducting reputation
manipulation.
Proof: To conduct a reputation manipulation attack, an ex-
ternal adversary can engage in any of the following strategies.
1) Forge and report valid feedback in the name of vehicle
Vr for a target vehicle V with its own choice of feedback
rating.
LI et al.: REPUTATION-BASED ANNOUNCEMENT SCHEME FOR VANETs 4101
2) Corrupt a vehicle Vr that is about to generate and report
a feedback F = (idV , idVr , fr, tb, tr,H(m), θ, δ) for the
target vehicle V and replace fr with a value of its own
choice.
3) Corrupt the reputation server and directly modify the
stored reputation score rsV of the target vehicle V .
Forging valid feedback involves forging a valid MAC value δ
generated using the MAC key of a legitimate vehicle. Assuming
the use of a secure MAC algorithm and that vehicles manage
their MAC keys appropriately, an external adversary is not
able to forge δ using the first strategy. It is also reasonable to
assume that that an external adversary is not able to corrupt a
vehicle to replace fr with a false feedback rating or corrupt
the reputation server to modify the stored reputation score.
Hence, our scheme provides strong robustness against external
adversaries conducting reputation manipulation attacks. 
B. Robustness Against Internal Adversaries
It is straightforward to see that our scheme does not provide
strong robustness against internal adversaries. This is because
an internal adversary with a time-discounted reputation score
greater than Ψrs can deceive its neighboring vehicles into
believing that a false message m′ is reliable. Further, when an
internal adversary receives a message tuple M = (m, tVb , θ, C)
from a target vehicle, it can always intentionally report false
feedback. In this section, we will analyze to what extent our
scheme is robust against internal adversaries.
1) Robustness Against Reputation Manipulation: We con-
sider the worst situation where all adversaries collude together
to attack the same target vehicle V with the same goal (to inflate
or deflate the reputation score of V ). Recall that to form a valid
feedback, an internal adversary has to obtain a valid message
tuple M = (m, tb, σ, C) generated by V and obtain it before
time tb +Ψt. We assume that Ψt is set such that only those
vehicles physically within wireless communication range of a
broadcasting vehicle are able to obtain a valid message tuple
before time tb +Ψt.
Claim 3: Let V denote all vehicles that have each reported at
least one valid feedback relating to V , and let Va ⊆ V denote
all internal adversaries among V . The robustness against inter-
nal adversaries conducting reputation manipulation is ΦRM =
|Va|/|V|.
Proof: Let Va ∈ Va be an internal adversary and rˆVa be
the intermediate value aggregated from all feedback reported
by Va for V , according to (1). It is easily seen that all false
feedback reported by Va for V only changes the intermediate
value rˆVa . The maximum influence of the intermediate value
rˆVa on the reputation score rs of the target vehicle V is equal
to 1/(|V|). Hence, the maximum extent of reputation manip-
ulation due to one internal adversary is 1/(|V|). Therefore, the
maximum extent of reputation manipulation due to all members
of Va is equal to (|Va|/|V|), i.e., ΦRM = |Va|/|V|. 
If |Va| is relatively small compared with the size of V , then
the maximum unfair impact of internal adversaries conducting
reputation manipulating attack is still small. In this case, Va
only adds a small noise into the reputation score of the target
vehicle. It is reasonable to assume that in a VANET, there is
only a small proportion of internal adversaries compared with
the entire population of vehicles. Hence, the unfair impact of
internal adversaries conducting reputation manipulating attack
remains small.
2) Robustness Against Message Fraud: With respect to a
message fraud attack, apart from those strategies mentioned in
Section V-A, which can be used by external adversaries, inter-
nal adversaries have an additional attack strategy. This strategy
is for an internal adversary to exploit its own reputation, as
described in the beginning of this section. However, an internal
adversary cannot use this strategy to conduct message fraud
persistently.
Claim 4: Let p denote the overall probability that vehicles
will report negative feedback upon being deceived by a false
message. Let the public parameter Ψnf be set such that Ψnf =
|Va|+Δ, where Δ is a safe margin. The robustness against
internal adversaries conducting message fraud is ΦMF =
|Va|+Δ/p.
Proof: If an internal adversary deceives more than
(Ψnf )/p vehicles during a time period of length T, then the
number of negative feedbacks reported for it is likely to be
greater than Ψnf . This results in its reputation score decreasing
to 0, as shown in (2). The internal adversary will thus be
revoked. Hence, the maximum number of vehicles that an
internal adversary can deceive during a time period of length
T without getting revoked is equal to (Ψnf )/p.
Note that a vehicle is revoked if |V−| ≥ Ψnf . Given Ψnf =
|Va|+Δ, then |V−| < Ψnf , meaning that the internal adver-
saries Va are not able to get the target vehicle V revoked by
reputation manipulation. The robustness of the scheme against
an internal adversary conducting message fraud is ΦMF =
|Va|+Δ/p. 
By combining Claims 3 and 4, we can conclude that
our scheme is (ΦMF = |Va|+Δ/p,ΦRM = |Va|/|V|) robust
against internal adversaries.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss other properties and issues related
to our scheme.
A. Fault Tolerance
One important advantage of our scheme is its fault tolerance.
This is shown from two perspectives: 1) temporary unavailabil-
ity of the reputation server and 2) temporary unavailability of
access points.
Recall that during the message broadcast and message reli-
ability evaluation phases, the reputation server is not involved.
In other words, the reputation server is offline with respect to
message broadcast and message reliability evaluation. From the
perspective of a vehicle, the reputation server is only needed
for reputation certificate retrieval and feedback reporting. The
temporary unavailability of the reputation server only affects
those vehicles that happen to retrieve their reputation certifi-
cates when the reputation server is unavailable. These vehicles
have to continue using their existing reputation certificates. This
negative effect only lasts until they successfully retrieve their
new reputation certificates the next time that the reputation
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server is available again. The operation of the system is largely
unaffected during the time when the reputation server is tem-
porarily unavailable.
Access points that become temporarily unavailable also do
not greatly affect the operation of the system. An unavailable
access point only affects those vehicles that happen to drive into
wireless communication range of the access point for retrieving
reputation certificates. In most cases, vehicles can be expected
to drive into wireless communication range of another working
access point within a reasonable time period.
B. Privacy
Privacy is often an important criteria of an announcement
scheme for VANETs. There has been active research into this
topic, e.g., [2], [10], [23], [25], and [26]. While privacy has
not been the main focus of this paper, it is worth noting that
this scheme provides a certain level of privacy for vehicles, as
follows.
1) The identity of a vehicle can easily be anonymized by us-
ing a pseudonym instead of the real identity. Our scheme
then provides a vehicle with anonymity with respect to all
entities except for the reputation server.
2) It is possible for the reputation server to issue multiple
pseudonyms and public keys for a vehicle. This requires
the reputation server to preembed multiple private keys
into the trusted hardware of the vehicle. This provides the
vehicle with an extent of unlikability with respect to mes-
sages broadcast: other entities (except for the reputation
server) cannot link messages broadcast under different
pseudonyms.
3) The reputation server does not learn messages from feed-
back, as only the hash value of a message is contained in
the feedback (see Section IV-D).
C. Incentive to Participation
One issue is a vehicle’s incentive for participating in the
announcement scheme. This has two facets, as follows.
1) Vehicles may lack incentive to broadcast a message to
other vehicles. This directly reduces the utilization of the
announcement scheme.
2) Vehicles may lack incentive to provide feedback. This
results in degradation of the accuracy and robustness
of the scheme, the latter arising since the probability
that vehicles will report negative feedback upon being
deceived by a false message is reduced.
One possible approach to increase the vehicles’ participation
is to introduce some incentives. For example, the reputation
server can introduce some policy that rewards a vehicle, with
some points for example, if it constantly has a high reputation
score or reports a large amount of feedback. Because the
reputation server acts as the central authority and maintains
all reputation and feedback information, it is easy for the
reputation server to introduce such rewarding policy.
D. Bootstrapping
Another issue is bootstrapping a new vehicle. In our scheme,
we specify that the initial reputation score of a new vehicle is
zero. This configuration often causes a bootstrapping problem
in a reputation system, where a newcomer has difficulty estab-
lishing its reputation. However, in our scheme, a new vehicle
with zero initial reputation score is still able to establish its
reputation. This is because, although messages broadcast by the
new vehicle will not be considered as reliable, the receiving
vehicles are still able to report feedback for these messages.
Gradually, the new vehicle will be able to establish its own
reputation.
It is also worth noting that assigning zero initial reputation
score to a new vehicle, as described in our scheme, is con-
servative. The purpose of this is to discourage a vehicle with
bad reputation from whitewashing its reputation by rejoining
the system with a new identity. This is useful when the cost of
rejoining the system with a new identity is negligible. However,
in a VANET, it is often difficult or costly for a vehicle to reenter
the system with a different identity. In this case, a new vehicle
could be initialized with a positive reputation, thus alleviating
the bootstrapping problem.
E. Use of Data Mining Techniques
Data mining techniques could be used to further improve
the accuracy and robustness of our scheme. In our scheme, all
feedback is kept by the reputation server. This makes it possible
for the reputation server to using data mining techniques to
distinguish false feedback from honest feedback and vehicles
reporting false feedback from those reporting honest feedback.
In addition, the richness of feedback may aid data mining
techniques to improve the detection accuracy. For example, we
have the following.
1) Feedback is linked to its reporting vehicle.
2) Time information is contained in feedback.
3) Feedback reported by different vehicles regarding the
same message can be linked together (as they share the
same H(m) entry in feedback tuple).
Such rich information may help data mining techniques to
improve the detection accuracy.
F. Incorporating Trusted Vehicles
In reality, some vehicles are widely regarded as trustworthy,
such as police vehicles, fire vehicles, and ambulances. Mes-
sages broadcast by trusted vehicles can be considered as reli-
able. In our scheme, it is easy to take into consideration trusted
vehicles. A simple solution, for example, is that the reputation
server initializes a trusted vehicle with a high reputation score,
such as 1.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of our announce-
ment scheme. We first show some simulation results and then
compare our scheme with other announcement schemes in
terms of performance.
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A. Simulation
In this section, we show some simulation results about the
performance of our announcement scheme. This is evaluated
from the following aspects.
1) Message drop rate: The average rate that reliable mes-
sages are rejected by a receiving vehicle due to low repu-
tation scores of broadcasting vehicles after time discount,
as described in Section IV-C.
2) Temporary unavailability of the reputation server: The av-
erage increase of message drop rate due to the temporary
unavailability of the reputation server.
3) Temporary unavailability of access points: The average
increase of message drop rate due to the temporary un-
availability of some access points.
We use an event-based real street map vehicular network
simulator called GrooveNet [27] and extend it to incorporate
our scheme into the simulator. The road network used in
simulations is an urban area of 10 km2 chosen from the city
of Pittsburgh, PA. These map data are extracted from the U.S.
Census Bureau’s TIGER/Line database [28]. The communica-
tion range is 30 min. The duration of each experiment is 30 min.
The configurations of these simulations are in line with many
studies in the literature, such as [19].
An experiment is configured and then conducted as follows.
1) Access points are generated and populated randomly over
the selected road network.
2) Vehicles are generated, populated randomly, and move
in the selected road network. Their mobility models are
as follows: A vehicle follows the vehicle in front, and
a vehicle moves at the speed limit of a street when it is
leading on the street. Their trip models are as follows: a
vehicle randomly moves until it is 10 km from its starting
point; the vehicle then takes the shortest path back to the
starting point and starts again along a different path.
3) Road events randomly occur in the road network through-
out the experiment. The time that an event will last is set
randomly from 1 to 120 s.
4) Vehicles that are sufficiently close to an event can “expe-
rience” the event. The distance for a vehicle to experience
an event is set randomly from 1 to 100 m.
5) A vehicle broadcasts a message regarding an event that it
experiences, along with its latest reputation certificate.
6) A message receiving vehicle determines whether it ac-
cepts the received message by evaluating the reputation
of the broadcasting vehicle, as specified in Section IV-C.
The reputation threshold parameter Ψrs is set conser-
vatively to 0.8. The time discount parameter Ψtd is set
conservatively to 1 h. Note that Ψtd in a real-world
implementation should be much longer than 1 h, perhaps
a few days or even longer. The purpose of setting it to 1 h
is to make the effect of the time discount function more
visible during the experiments as well as to make it in line
with 30 min of experiment time.
7) A message receiving vehicle may report feedback if it
later experiences the event described by the message
within the time when the event still exists. The probability
Fig. 1. Decrease of message drop rate due to the increase of access point
density.
that the vehicle will report a feedback is set conserva-
tively to 0.1.
8) When a vehicle moves into communication range of
an access point, it retrieves and then updates its latest
reputation certificate and reports all feedback that it has
generated and not yet reported.
9) The reputation server updates the reputation of each
vehicle based on feedback received from all vehicles
and generates a new reputation certificate accordingly, as
specified by Sections IV-E and F. The time interval T is
set to 10 min. Note that T in a real-world implementation
should be much longer than 10 min: perhaps weeks or
even longer. The purpose of setting such a short time
interval T in the experiments is, again, to make it in line
with 30 min of experiment time.
Fig. 1 shows the simulation results of message drop rate with
respect to the different density of access points and vehicles.
From Fig. 1, the results of experiments show that the message
drop rate decreases when the density of access points increases.
A sharp decrease of message drop rate is seen when the number
of access points is increased from 1 to 2 km−2. Then, the
decrease of message drop rate becomes relatively slow when
the number of access points is increased from 2 to 5 km−2. This
is natural since if there are more access points, then vehicles
tend to encounter them more often and thus tend to retrieve the
latest reputation certificate more frequently from the reputation
server. As a result, vehicles tend to broadcast messages with
more “fresh” reputation certificates, and the reputation scores
will tend to be discounted less by the receiving vehicles using
the time discount function TimeDiscount. This results in less
rejection of reliable messages and thus a decrease in the mes-
sage drop rate.
The density of vehicles also impacts on the message drop
rate. We observe a decrease of message drop rate when the
density of vehicles increases. A modest but noticeable decrease
is seen when the density of vehicles increases from 100 to
500 vehicles in the selected road network of 10 km−2. This
is reasonable because more feedback tends to be reported for
a vehicle in a vehicle-dense road network. Consequently, it
is more likely that feedback whose corresponding message
tuple was broadcast within the past T time is reported for a
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Fig. 2. Increase of message drop rate due to temporary unavailabilities of the
reputation server.
vehicle, and thus, a reputation certificate becomes available
for the vehicle. This results in the reliable messages broadcast
subsequently by the vehicle being accepted by the receiving
vehicles, given that the broadcasting vehicle has a sufficiently
high reputation score. Hence, we observe a decrease in the
message drop rate.
However, this observed difference in the message drop rate
due to the density of vehicles may not be as significant as shown
in our experiments. This is because in our experiments, the time
interval T is set to 10 min, which is much shorter compared to a
real-world implementation. This causes a reputation certificate
to be less likely available to a vehicle compared with an
implementation with a much longer T.
In addition, in our simulations, the communication range of
a vehicle and an access point is set conservatively to 300 m.
If it is set to 1000 m, the maximum communication range of
the standard 802.11p, then the message drop rate should further
decrease. This is because vehicles can “meet” an access point
and retrieve the latest reputation certificate more frequently.
Fig. 2 shows the simulation results of the increase of the
message drop rate due to the temporary unavailability of the
reputation server with respect to various densities of access
points. In these experiments, we deployed and populated 500
simulated vehicles. From Fig. 2, the results of the experiments
show that the increase of the message drop rate is approxi-
mately proportional to the unavailable time of the reputation
server when the unavailable time is less than 12 min. When
the unavailable time reaches 12 min, the message drop rate
increases to 1. This is reasonable because in our experiments
we set the time discount parameter Ψtd to 1 h and the reputation
threshold parameter Ψrs to 0.8. With these configurations, the
time-discounted reputation score of a vehicle cannot exceed the
reputation threshold if the reputation certificate was obtained
from the reputation server more than 12 min ago.
However, in a real-world implementation in which a much
longer time discount parameter Ψtd is expected, the rate of
increase in the message drop rate due to temporary unavail-
abilities of the reputation server is expected to be significantly
slower compared to the experiments. The minimum unavailable
time of the reputation server that will result in a complete
message drop is expected to extend long beyond 12 min.
Fig. 3 shows the simulation results of the increase of the
message drop rate due to the temporary unavailability of some
access points. In these experiments, we deployed and populated
Fig. 3. Increase of message drop rate due to temporary unavailabilities of
some access points.
500 simulated vehicles and 50 access points. We examined the
increase in the message drop rate caused by various proportions
of access points being unavailable for different periods of
time, i.e., from 5 to 25 min. From Fig. 3, the results of the
experiments show that the temporary unavailable access points
slightly contribute to the increase in the message drop rate. This
is reasonable, since when a vehicle comes across an unavailable
access point, it can later retrieve its reputation certificate and
report feedback via another working access point.
B. Performance Comparison
In this section, our scheme is compared with threshold
schemes, which have been the mainstream announcement
schemes. Our performance comparison focuses on communi-
cation overhead and processing delay. We choose two typical
threshold-based schemes [2], [22] to represent threshold-based
schemes, since their performance results are available in their
papers.
With respect to the communication overhead, in our scheme,
a message is accompanied by one identifier, two time stamps,
one public key, two digital signatures, and one reputation sore.
If we implement the digital signature schemes DS1 and DS2
using the standard IEEE 1609.2 ECDSA over NIST P-224
curve signature scheme, which has 112-bit security level, then
a public key and a signature is 28 and 56 B, respectively
[29]. If we choose ECDSA over NIST P-192 curve signature
scheme, which has 80-bit security level, then a public key and
a signature is 24 and 48 B, respectively [29]. If we further
use 4, 8, and 1 B to represent an identifier, a time stamp,
and a reputation score, respectively, then the communication
overhead of our scheme with 112- and 80-bit security levels are
4 + 8 + 8 + 28 + 56 + 56 + 1 = 161 bytes and 4 + 8 + 8 +
24 + 48 + 48 + 1 = 141 bytes, respectively. In comparison, in
the threshold scheme of [2], a message is accompanied by one
signature of at least 160 B to achieve 80-bit security level. In the
other threshold scheme of [22], a message is accompanied by
one time stamp, one public key, and two signatures. If ECDSA
over NIST P-192 curve signature scheme is adopted to achieve
80-bit security level, and the time stamp takes 8 B, then the
communication overhead of this scheme is 8 + 24 + 48 + 48 =
128 bytes.
With respect to the processing delay, signing and verifi-
cation of an ECDSA over NIST P-224 curve signature take
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3.3 and 6.5 ms, respectively, on a Pentium II 400 MHz ma-
chine [29]. Signing and verification of an ECDSA over NIST
P-192 curve signature take 2.1 and 4.3 ms, respectively, on
the same machine [29]. For our scheme, the processing of one
message involves one signing (sender) and two verifications
(recipient), which takes 3.3 + 6.5 + 6.5 = 16.3 ms for 112-bit
security level and 2.1 + 4.3 + 4.3 = 10.7 ms for 80-bit security
level. In comparison, in the threshold scheme of [2], signing
and verification of a signature take at least 8.1 and 25.5 ms,
respectively, on an Intel Pentium IV 3.0-GHz machine. The pro-
cessing of one message involves one signing (sender) and one
verification (recipient), which takes 8.1 + 25.5 ms = 33.6 ms
for 80-bit security level. In the other threshold scheme of [22],
the processing of one message involves one signing (sender)
and two verifications (recipient), which takes 2.1 + 4.3 + 4.3 =
10.7 ms for 80-bit security level.
Our comparison results show that with respect to the com-
munication overhead and processing delay on one message,
our scheme is similar to threshold-based schemes. However,
note that in our scheme, a receiving vehicle requires only one
message to trigger an action, whereas for a threshold-based
scheme, multiple messages are required. Thus, by considering
the overall communication overhead and processing delay, our
scheme significantly outperforms threshold schemes.
Regarding the network modeling approach [6] and the trust-
and reputation-based approaches [1], [5], [12], [18] that were
discussed in Section II, these schemes are still at a conceptual
level and lack technical details and performance evaluation.
We thus cannot provide a detailed performance comparison
between our schemes and these schemes.
VIII. EXTENDED AND SIMPLIFIED VARIANTS
In this section, we discuss some possible approaches to
extend our standard scheme to increase its efficiency and
flexibility. We will discuss how to facilitate multiple message
broadcast to improve efficiency and how to enable a richer
reputation evaluation to improve flexibility.
We also demonstrate how the proposed scheme can be sim-
plified to reduce some of the hardware requirements on vehi-
cles. The price for such simplification is weakened robustness
against internal adversaries. We will discuss a simplified variant
that does not require vehicles to have a secure clock and another
simplified variant where vehicles do not require either a secure
clock or a trusted hardware.
A. Multiple Message Broadcast
In this section, we discuss how to facilitate multiple message
broadcasts to improve the efficiency of our scheme. In the stan-
dard scheme, a message tuple contains only one message m. If
vehicle Vb intends to broadcast n messages (m1,m2, . . . ,mn),
it has to generate n message tuples. A receiving vehicle then
has to evaluate the reliability of each individual message tuple.
In this section, we extend the standard scheme to facilitate
multiple message broadcasts.
Suppose vehicle Vb wants to broadcast a message vector
M = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) containing n messages. We briefly
describe the modification of the standard scheme as follows.
During the message broadcast phase, Vb computes the hash
value H(mi) for every mi ∈ M. It then computes a hash value
as follows:
h = H (H(m1),H(m2), . . . ,H(mn)) .
It then submits h to the trusted hardware to obtain a time-
stamped signature θ = Sign2(tb, h)skVb . Then, a message tuple
M = (M, tb, θ, C) is formed. During the message reliability
evaluation phase, a receiving vehicle Vr checks the validity of
θ on the tuple (tb,H(H(m1),H(m2), . . . ,H(mn))).
During the feedback reporting phase, Vr first generates a
feedback rating vector R = (fr1, fr2, . . . , frn). If it provides
a feedback rating for message mi, then it assigns fri ∈ {0, 1};
otherwise, it assigns fri with ⊥, which denotes that it assigns
no rating for message mi. Then, Vr submits the following to its
trusted hardware:
(idVb , idVr , R, tb,H(m1),H(m2), . . . ,H(mn), θ) .
This is to obtain a MAC value δ as follows:
δ = MAC (idVb , idVr , R, tb, tr
H(m1),H(m2), . . . ,H(mn), θ)mkVr .
Finally, Vr forms a feedback tuple as follows:
F = (idVb , idVr , R, tb, tr,H(m1),H(m2), . . . ,H(mn), θ, δ) .
During the reputation update phase, if all verifications are
successful, then the reputation server uses all feedback ratings
fri 	=⊥ to update the reputation score of Vb.
By adopting this extension, a vehicle is able to simultane-
ously broadcast multiple messages. A receiving vehicle can
also simultaneously verify the reliability of all messages in a
message vector. Moreover, the additional computational cost of
this extension is negligible. This is because the additional com-
putation involves only hash operations, which are significantly
faster than the digital signature operations used in the standard
scheme. Compared with the standard scheme, the broadcasting
vehicle in this extended scheme only performs n extra hash
operations to broadcast a message vector with n messages. A
receiving vehicle also only performs n extra hash operations to
verify the reliability of all messages in the message vector.
On the other hand, this extension incurs some additional
communication overhead when a receiving vehicle reports
a feedback tuple to the reputation server. A feedback tu-
ple has to include the feedback rating for every message
fr1, fr2, . . . , frn and the hash value of every message
H(m1),H(m2), . . . ,H(mn). The length of a feedback tuple in
this extension is longer than that of the standard scheme.
B. Multilevel Reputation Evaluation
In this section, we discuss how to enable a richer reputa-
tion evaluation to improve the flexibility of the scheme. In
the standard scheme, a vehicle maintains only one threshold
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Ψrs to compare against the time-discounted reputation score
when making a decision as to whether a received message is
reliable. However, some messages tend to be more critical than
others. We may accept a critical message only if it is provided
by a highly reputable vehicle. Similarly, we may accept an
unimportant message if it is provided by a reasonably reputable
vehicle.
The standard scheme can easily be extended to facil-
itate the aforementioned multilevel reputation evaluation.
The reputation server simply installs multiple thresholds
(Ψ1rs,Ψ
2
rs, . . . ,Ψ
n
rs) into each vehicle. These correspond to
different levels of importance for different messages. When a
vehicle receives a message, it just selects the corresponding
threshold to compare against the time-discounted reputation
score.
C. Simplified Variant 1
In our standard scheme, we assume that each vehicle is
equipped with a secure clock. In this section, we relax this
assumption: we assume that each vehicle has a clock that is
not protected by the trusted hardware, i.e., the vehicle is able to
modify the time information output by the clock. We outline
this simplified variant by modifying the standard scheme as
follows.
The vehicle clock regulation protocol VCRP and the public
parameter Ψt are no longer required. Vehicles periodically
synchronize their clocks with the reputation server. During the
message broadcast phase, Vb retrieves the current time tb from
its clock, which is not protected by the trusted hardware. During
the message reliability evaluation phase, Steps 1, 2, and 3b
are removed. During the feedback reporting phase, Vr forms
a feedback tuple F = (idVb , idVr , tb, fr,H(m), θ, δ). Note that
tr in the standard scheme is removed in this variant. During the
reputation update phase, Step 1a is removed.
This variant still provides strong robustness against external
adversaries but it is less robust against internal adversaries. In
this variant, the restriction removed from the standard scheme
is that a vehicle is only able to generate valid feedback if it
receives a message tuple before the time tb +Ψt. Removing
this restriction means that there is no time limitation on receiv-
ing a message tuple to generate valid feedback. Hence, internal
adversaries can engage in the following strategy. Once an inter-
nal adversary obtains a message from the target vehicle, it later
forwards it to another internal adversary when they drive within
wireless communication range of each other. This message
tuple can be further propagated to other internal adversaries in
the same manner. All internal adversaries receiving the message
tuple, regardless of the receiving time, report feedback relating
to the target vehicle.
Let V′a denote the set of internal adversaries obtaining at
least one message tuple generated by the target vehicle. The
robustness of this variant becomes (ΦMF = |V′a|/p,ΦRM =
|V′a|/|V|), by the same argument in Section V-B. It is straight-
forward to see that the size of V′a is greater than or equal
to that of Va. Hence, the robustness of this variant may be
less than that of the standard scheme. However, if the size
of V′a is still sufficiently small such that ΦMF = |V′a|/p and
ΦRM = |V′a|/|V| are still acceptable, then this variant can be
an option for implementation.
D. Simplified Variant 2
In this variant, we remove the restriction from the standard
scheme that each vehicle is equipped with trusted hardware
and a secure clock. Instead, we assume that the OBU of a
vehicle is equipped with a computing device without trusted
hardware storage and a nonprotected clock. Note that in this
variant, we do not assume that the OBU has a tamper-resistant
device. Hence, the vehicle itself is able to access its private
key and MAC key, which is prevented in the standard scheme.
We outline this variant by modifying the standard scheme as
follows.
The vehicle clock regulation protocol VCRP and the public
parameter Ψt are no longer required. Vehicles themselves pe-
riodically synchronize their clocks with the reputation server.
During admission of a new vehicle, the reputation server sends
its private key and MAC key over a secure channel to the vehi-
cle. These are no longer kept confidential from the vehicle. Dur-
ing the message broadcast phase, Vb retrieves the current time tb
from the nonprotected clock. Instead of the trusted hardware, Vb
itself generates the signature θ = Sign2(tb,H(m))skVb . During
the message reliability evaluation phase, Steps 1, 2, and 3b
are removed. During the feedback reporting phase, Step 2
is removed. During the reputation update phase, Step 1a is
removed.
This variant also provides strong robustness against external
adversaries. However, it is less robust against internal adver-
saries than the standard scheme and Variant 1. In this variant,
the restriction further removed from Variant 1 is that a vehicle
is not able to access its private key and MAC key. Removing
this restriction means that internal adversaries can engage in
another strategy. An internal adversary distributes its MAC
key to another colluding internal adversary. Consequently, one
internal adversary is able to generate feedback on behalf of
another colluding internal adversary. This provides internal
adversaries with a convenient way of conducting a reputation
manipulation attack. Given every internal adversary possesses
the MAC key of every other internal adversary from a colluding
group, once an internal adversary receives a message tuple from
a target vehicle, it can generate and report feedback on behalf
of every colluding internal adversary.
Let V∗a denote the set of all internal adversaries. Then, the
robustness of this variant becomes (ΦMF = |V∗a|/p,ΦRM =
|V∗a|/|V|). It is easily seen that |Va| ≤ |V′a| ≤ |V∗a|. Hence, the
robustness of this variant may be less than that of the standard
scheme and Variant 1. However, if the size of V∗a is relatively
small compared with that of V , then Variant 2 is also another
option for implementation.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a novel reputation-based
announcement scheme for VANETs to evaluate message re-
liability. We have shown that our scheme is robust against
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external adversaries and robust against internal adversaries to
a reasonably good level.
In future work, it might be of interest to investigate the
following aspects.
1) Although the current scheme already provides a certain
level of privacy, it might be of interest to further enhance
the privacy protection of the scheme.
2) In the current scheme, a vehicle and its human driver
are represented by a single entity. It might be of interest
to extend our scheme to reflect the potentially different
reputations of human drivers and vehicles separately.
3) In the current scheme, a message broadcast by a vehicle
is only utilized by its neighboring vehicles. It might be of
interest to extend the current scheme in such a way that a
message can be utilized by vehicles in a greater area.
4) In this paper, we present a simple feedback aggregation
algorithm based on binary feedback ratings. It might
be of interest to investigate alternative approaches that
allow continuous feedback ratings and thus provide richer
results.
5) It might be interest to investigate some concrete data
mining techniques that can be used to further improve the
robustness of the scheme.
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